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Since the World Health Organization declared the
global outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) contained in July 2003, new cases have periodical-
ly reemerged in Asia. This situation has placed hospitals
and health officials worldwide on heightened alert. In a
future outbreak, rapidly and accurately distinguishing
SARS from other common febrile respiratory illnesses
(FRIs) could be difficult. We constructed a decision-analy-
sis model to identify the most efficient strategies for manag-
ing undifferentiated FRIs within a hypothetical SARS
outbreak in New York City during the season of respiratory
infections. If establishing reliable epidemiologic links were
not possible, societal costs would exceed $2.0 billion per
month. SARS testing with existing polymerase chain reac-
tion assays would have harmful public health and econom-
ic consequences if SARS made up <0.1% of circulating
FRIs. Increasing influenza vaccination rates among the
general population before the onset of respiratory season
would save both money and lives.
O
n July 5, 2003, the World Health Organization
(WHO) declared that human chains of transmission of
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) had ended.
Since then, new cases of SARS have resurfaced in Asia,
including several in the absence of laboratory exposures.
This reemergence of the SARS-associated coronavirus
(SARS-CoV) has sparked international concern and has
prompted heightened surveillance by hospitals and health
officials worldwide. Such concerns have been amplified
by fears that a future SARS outbreak could coincide with
respiratory infection season, when influenza infections and
other febrile respiratory illnesses (FRIs) develop in large
segments of the population. 
Current SARS case-definition and case-exclusion crite-
ria encompass clinical, epidemiologic, and laboratory fea-
tures (1). Should the timely establishment of epidemiolog-
ic links between SARS cases be lost in a future outbreak,
frontline healthcare providers would be forced to rely on
clinical signs and symptoms or diagnostic testing to con-
firm or exclude infections with SARS-CoV (2).
Unfortunately, the signs and symptoms of SARS are non-
specific and cannot be used reliably to differentiate SARS
from other FRIs. Moreover, existing serologic tests for
SARS-CoV cannot definitively exclude infection until at
least 4 weeks has elapsed from the onset of symptoms and
thus have no role in early clinical decision making (1).
Although reverse transcriptase–polymerase chain reaction
(RT-PCR) assays used to detect SARS-CoV can provide
test results within a matter of hours, their suboptimal sen-
sitivity makes them inadequate for ruling out SARS (3).
Furthermore, since SARS infections would likely make up
a minute fraction of FRIs circulating among the general
population, the pretest probability, and thus the positive
predictive value of RT-PCR tests, would be extremely low,
even if future generation assays had better test sensitivity
and specificity. 
In 2003 and 2004, the emergence of SARS-CoV in
China coincided with respiratory illness season, which
suggests that the virus may resurface during winter
months, like many other respiratory pathogens. Should this
seasonal pattern recur, rapidly and accurately differentiat-
ing SARS infections from other FRIs would become a crit-
ical component of any future outbreak containment efforts
(2,3). This distinction will also continue to be an important
issue among travelers in whom FRIs develop after their
return from SARS-affected areas. However, existing diag-
nostic limitations place frontline healthcare practitioners in
a precarious position, since clinical decisions with poten-
tially dangerous consequences must be made in the face of
uncertainty. Recognizing such limitations, WHO recently
called for the development of evidence-based clinical
algorithms to help address these diagnostic dilemmas (4).
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Overview and Definitions
A hypothetical cohort comprising all residents of New
York City was entered into a decision-analysis model. The
model is premised on a SARS outbreak during respirato-
ry season where person-to-person transmission of SARS
is documented and epidemiologic links between cases are
poorly defined. The outbreak was designed to be consis-
tent in size and duration with the Toronto outbreak (5).
The analytic horizon of the analysis was defined as the
expected lifetime of persons living in New York City dur-
ing the 2004–2005 respiratory illness season. FRIs are
defined herein as nonspecific infections caused by
pathogens other than SARS-CoV for which the microbio-
logic origin cannot be determined on the basis of clinical
grounds alone. The model was designed to identify the
most effective and cost-effective uses of societal
resources in managing FRIs of undetermined origin dur-
ing a SARS outbreak.
The analysis was conducted in adherence with the ref-
erence case scenario as defined by the Panel on Cost-
Effectiveness in Health and Medicine (6). All relevant
costs and benefits were considered from the societal per-
spective of New York City, including those related to sec-
ondary transmission of SARS. Since costs and changes in
health-related quality of life in the analysis were limited to
a single respiratory season, no discounting was performed
on these 2 parameters. However, all future years of life lost
due to premature death from infections were discounted at
an annual rate of 3%. 
Decision-Analysis Model
A decision-analysis model was constructed by using
DATA 4.0 (TreeAge Software, Williamstown, MA, USA)
that examined 2 competing strategies in the context of a
SARS outbreak coinciding with respiratory season: 1)
home isolation for persons with FRIs of undetermined ori-
gin, pending fever and symptom resolution for at least 24
hours and 2) outpatient diagnostic testing of FRIs to ascer-
tain a microbiologic diagnosis with subsequent test-driven
management. A third complementary strategy entailing
mass influenza vaccination among the general population
before the onset of respiratory season was considered in
conjunction with the above competing strategies.
Primary assumptions of the model were as follows: 1)
epidemiologic linkages between SARS cases are not well
defined; 2) SARS cannot reliably be distinguished from
other FRIs on clinical grounds alone; 3) current SARS
tests cannot definitively rule out infection early in the
course of illness (1,7); 4) public nonadherence to home
isolation guidelines during a SARS outbreak would be
negligible (5,8); 5) positive SARS (RT-PCR) test requires
isolation precautions pending confirmation of the diagno-
sis (2); 6) patients with confirmed SARS cases will be
managed as inpatients pending resolution of the clinical ill-
ness; 7) patients with confirmed SARS cases require isola-
tion precautions for 10 days after resolution of illness (2);
8) persons with FRIs of undetermined origin must be
afebrile and symptom-free for 24 hours before returning to
work; 9) negative SARS (RT-PCR) test alone will have no
influence on SARS isolation precautions (2); 10) negative
SARS (RT-PCR) test result combined with a positive test
for another respiratory pathogen will result in the discon-
tinuation of SARS isolation precautions (2); 11) in the
absence of appropriate isolation precautions, persons with
SARS will transmit infection to 3 additional persons
(9,10); 12) SARS, influenza, respiratory syncytial virus,
and community-acquired pneumonia are the primary caus-
es of death from FRIs; 13) a future SARS outbreak would
be managed by using existing healthcare infrastructure;
and 14) no proven effective treatment for SARS currently
exists.
A plausible range of high and low values for each vari-
able was used to conduct sensitivity analyses, which exam-
ined the influence of parameter error on the results of the
analysis. Selected variables in the model are listed in
Tables 1 and 2.
Composition of FRIs
We used nationally representative data (25,27) in con-
junction with studies published in the medical literature
(11,28–30) to derive our base estimates for an “average”
respiratory season. In our model, the microbiologic origin
of an FRI was categorized into 1 of 4 mutually exclusive
groups: 1) SARS-CoV and coronaviruses OC43 and 229E;
2) influenza viruses A and B; 3) a panel of common respi-
ratory pathogens, including respiratory syncytial viruses A
and B, parainfluenza viruses 1–3, human metapneu-
movirus,  Bordetella pertussis,  Chlamydia pneumoniae,
Mycoplasma pneumoniae, Legionella pneumophila, and L.
micdadei; and 4) all other causes. 
In our base-case analysis, we assigned the proportion of
FRIs due to SARS to be 0.01%, which was estimated
assuming a SARS outbreak of similar size and duration to
the Toronto outbreak. The proportion of FRIs due to
influenza was derived from 2 large observational studies
conducted over multiple respiratory seasons (11,28) and
was corroborated by dividing the expected proportion of
the U.S. population who get influenza each season (25) by
the proportion of the U.S. population having influenzalike
infections (27). The proportion of FRIs due to the common
respiratory pathogen panel listed above was estimated
from the medical literature (29,30). In our base-case sce-
nario, we estimated that approximately one third of FRIs
would be due to influenza, one third would be due to the
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one third would be due to other miscellaneous pathogens
not indicated above.
Diagnostic Tests
We evaluated 3 categories of rapid diagnostic tests with
optimal turnaround times of <24 hours. The first category
constitutes RT-PCR assays capable of detecting SARS-
CoV as well as coronaviruses OC43 and 229E (23,24). A
second category includes 2 multiplex PCR assays, which,
when used in combination, can detect 13 different respira-
tory pathogens, including influenza viruses Aand B, respi-
ratory syncytial viruses A and B, parainfluenza viruses
1–3, human metapneumovirus, C. pneumoniae, M. pneu-
moniae,  L. pneumophila,  L. micdadei, and B. pertussis
(20–22). The third category comprises a widely available
enzyme immunoassay capable of rapidly detecting infec-
tions with influenza A and B (19). 
The sensitivity and specificity of these tests were
obtained from the medical literature (19–24), while the
positive predictive value of each diagnostic test was calcu-
lated by incorporating the estimated prevalence of specific
pathogens into Bayes’ equation. 
Influenza Vaccination
The effectiveness of the influenza vaccine was derived
from the medical literature (31). To account for seasonal
variation between circulating strains of influenza and the
composition of the trivalent vaccine, we varied the effec-
tiveness of the vaccine over a wide range of plausible val-
ues in our sensitivity analysis. The average seasonal
effectiveness of the influenza vaccine was adjusted by
assuming that the vaccine would be poorly matched to cir-
culating influenza strains approximately twice every 10
years (31). 
We used data from the U.S. Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System to estimate seasonal influenza vacci-
nation rates among the population of New York City (33).
In our sensitivity analyses, we evaluated the incremental
costs and benefits of raising vaccination rates above this
seasonal average. 
Management Algorithms 
In our model, the home isolation strategy required per-
sons with FRIs of undetermined origin to remain at home
for at least 24 hours after resolution of illness. We assumed
that adherence to public health guidelines in the setting of
a widespread SARS outbreak would be near universal
(5,8). Under this strategy, we assumed that persons would
attempt to manage their illness at home by using self-care,
visit a healthcare provider if the illness were serious or per-
sistent, or proceed to a hospital if their illness became pro-
gressively severe.
The diagnostic evaluation strategy involved outpatient
testing of persons with FRIs to ascertain a microbiologic
origin. In this strategy, persons with FRIs of undetermined
cause would observe home isolation precautions until the
results of diagnostic tests were available. We assumed that
a positive SARS RT-PCR test would require isolation pre-
cautions for the patient, public health intervention, and
additional testing to confirm the diagnosis (2). We also
assumed that a negative SARS RT-PCR test in conjunction
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would lead to the elimination of isolation precautions (2).
If all test results were negative, we assumed that isolation
precautions would remain in effect, since current SARS
RT-PCR assays are not sufficiently sensitive to rule out
SARS (2). We also assumed that persons with FRIs, for
which the microbiologic origin was confirmed to be due to
a pathogen other than SARS-CoV, would return to work
only after resolution of their illness.
Under each strategy, we considered the possibility that
persons with FRIs seeking medical care might receive
antimicrobial drugs during their evaluation. We estimated
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Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (32). 
Illness and Death
Changes in health-related quality of life (HRQL),
including the impact of isolation, due to SARS and other
FRIs were derived by using the Health Utilities Index
Mark 3 (HUI) (34). We used the HUI to minimize double
counting of productivity losses, since HRQL scores gener-
ated from this instrument do not include productivity loss-
es (William Furlong, pers. comm.). Parameters for the HUI
were derived from a panel of 4 specialist physicians with
clinical experience managing SARS patients in Toronto.
These physicians did not directly value health states, but
rather functioned as expert “describers,” who facilitated
the mapping of heath states to community-based prefer-
ence scores from the HUI.  
SARS, influenza, respiratory syncytial virus, and com-
munity-acquired pneumonia due to typical and atypical
bacteria were assumed to be the primary contributors of
death from FRIs on a population level. Mortality data for
community-acquired pneumonia were obtained from the
National Center for Health Statistics (35); data for SARS,
influenza, and respiratory syncytial virus were obtained
from the medical literature (24,26,36). We estimated that
patients with SARS would each transmit infection to 3
other persons if appropriate isolation precautions were not
observed (e.g., false-negative SARS RT-PCR test com-
bined with a false-positive test for an alternate diagnosis)
(9,10). 
Costs and Charges
Costs attributable to transportation, ambulatory care
(13), laboratory tests (16), influenza vaccination (11),
antimicrobial agents (12), hospitalization (14,15), public
health investigation (5,18), and patient time (17) were
included in the analysis. Transportation costs to see a med-
ical provider were derived by using U.S. national data and
were adjusted to account for the estimated proportion of
the population driving, using public transportation, or trav-
eling by other means such as biking or walking. The base
cost of an ambulatory care visit was estimated by using the
national average 2000 Medicare reimbursement rates for a
focused medical evaluation (CPT-code 99213); the cost of
the rapid influenza test was derived from the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (16). The costs of the
SARS RT-PCR assay and the multiplex PCR assays used
to detect the common respiratory pathogen panel were
obtained from a test manufacturer and included 15 minutes
of technician time (Prodesse Inc., pers. comm.)(18).
Influenza vaccination and antimicrobial drug costs
were obtained by using average wholesale prices of phar-
maceuticals (11,12). The costs and frequency of adverse
reactions to influenza vaccination were estimated from the
medical literature and incorporated into the net costs and
benefits of the vaccine (37). 
Hospital charges and the average length of stay for
patients with influenza and other respiratory infections
requiring hospitalization were estimated from the
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (14). The
Medicare Provider Analysis and Review system was used
to derive cost-to-charge ratios and subsequently convert
hospital charges into societal costs (38). Per diem hospital-
ization costs for SARS were approximated by using ICD-
9 code 769, “respiratory distress syndrome,” which was
subsequently multiplied by the average length of stay for
hospitalized patients with SARS (15). Public health costs,
including contact investigation, were estimated from the
Toronto SARS experience (5). 
Patient time costs were estimated from data on the
median salary of persons living in New York City and
included time spent in travel and receiving medical care
(17). When applicable, medical and nonmedical costs were
adjusted to 2004 U.S. dollars by using the Consumer Price
Index. The potential economic effects of a SARS outbreak
on tourism or other commercial industries were not consid-
ered in the analysis.
Results
If SARS were to resurface during the 2004–2005 respi-
ratory season and the timely establishment of epidemio-
logic links between SARS cases was not possible, our
analysis estimates that the societal costs for New York City
would exceed $2.0 billion for each month in which the
SARS outbreak and respiratory season coincided. 
In our base-case analysis, we found the use of multiplex
PCR assays to detect infections with a broad panel of com-
mon respiratory pathogens to be the dominant strategy,
saving $79 million and resulting in the gain of 8,474 qual-
ity-adjusted life-years (QALYs) relative to a strategy of
home isolation. If SARS RT-PCR testing were used in con-
junction with multiplex PCR assays in our base-case sce-
nario, however, we estimate that costs would increase by
about $87 million and have lower effectiveness than mul-
tiplex PCR testing alone. These findings are directly
related to the very low positive predictive value of the
SARS RT-PCR test under low prevalence conditions and
the harm resulting from false-positive test results.
If SARS testing were unavailable, confirming an alter-
nate diagnosis for an FRI would be the most effective and
least expensive strategy, dominating a strategy of influen-
za testing alone or home isolation. However, if multiplex
PCR testing were also unavailable, home isolation would
be the least expensive strategy, albeit less effective than
Distinguishing Febrile Respiratory Illnesses from SARS
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be accomplished at an incremental cost of $9.0 million but
would result in gains of 5,286 QALYs (incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio of $1,702 per QALY gained). If the
described outbreak were to unfold, a campaign to increase
influenza vaccination rates among the general population
before the onset of respiratory season would save an esti-
mated $5.0 million and lead to the gain of 128 QALYs for
each percentage of New York City’s population vaccinated
above the seasonal baseline. 
The total costs, the number of QALYs gained, and the
incremental cost-effectiveness of each strategy in the
model is shown in Table 3. The results of sensitivity analy-
ses are shown in Table 4 and Figure 1. Algorithms outlin-
ing optimal treatment strategies under different testing
capabilities are shown in Figure 2.
Discussion
Our analysis indicates that current diagnostic limita-
tions in discriminating SARS from other common FRIs
could have enormous public health and economic conse-
quences, particularly if epidemiologic links between
SARS cases were to become tenuous. Under such condi-
tions, we found that most costs would not be related to
SARS infections themselves, but rather to procedural
changes in the management of other FRIs due to the
known or perceived presence of SARS.
We report 3 key findings with direct policy relevance.
First, in our base analysis, the most efficient mechanism
for discriminating SARS infections from other FRIs
involves excluding SARS by confirming an alternate diag-
nosis. This approach is the most cost-effective strategy
under low prevalence conditions since the positive predic-
tive value of SARS RT-PCR tests would be extremely low,
and false-positive SARS tests would have deleterious soci-
etal repercussions. While the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention supports an approach of excluding SARS
by confirming an alternate diagnosis (2), caution is advised
since SARS coinfection with other respiratory pathogens,
including the human metapneumovirus, has been docu-
mented (39).
Second, we demonstrate that SARS testing under low
prevalence conditions would be detrimental from both a
public health and an economic perspective. In our analysis,
the low positive predictive value of the SARS RT-PCR test
translates into unnecessary costs from diagnostic testing,
public health interventions, and lost opportunity costs for
persons with false-positive test results. Moreover, negative
consequences on quality of life would occur when persons
are incorrectly diagnosed as having an infection with
SARS. Our sensitivity analyses indicate that SARS diag-
nostic testing should not be performed unless the preva-
lence or pretest probability of SARS among persons
presenting with FRIs exceeds 0.1%. 
Third, the use of influenza vaccination as a means to
distinguish SARS from influenza has been debated (40). In
our analysis, we find that if SARS reemerged during respi-
ratory season, higher rates of influenza vaccination among
the general population would lead to both health benefits
and economic savings. These savings would occur by
reductions in influenza illness and death, reductions in
costs related to the investigation and isolation of persons
with FRIs, and increases in the pretest probability of SARS
and, therefore, the positive predictive value of SARS diag-
nostic testing. The policy implications of these findings,
however, must be carefully considered in the context of
available influenza vaccine supplies and must ensure their
prioritization for groups at high risk (40). 
Our analysis has several limitations. Foremost was our
inability to derive specific estimates of the proportion of
FRIs due to specific pathogens. Since the seasonal compo-
sition of respiratory viruses and bacteria varies across
regions and seasons, we attempted to derive estimates that
best reflected seasonal averages. Although national
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on other common respiratory pathogens are more limited,
since most of these pathogens are self-limited, nonre-
portable diseases, for which treatment is infrequently
sought.
We estimated the sensitivity of current SARS RT-PCR
assays to be ≈70% (4); however, we recognize that the type
of specimen tested and the timing of collection can influ-
ence the test’s sensitivity (4,36). In our base-case scenario,
in which SARS represented 0.01% of all circulating FRIs,
changes in SARS RT-PCR test sensitivity had a negligible
impact on overall societal costs and population health. If
the pretest probability of SARS were to increase substan-
tially above our baseline, however, SARS RT-PCR test
sensitivity would have an increasingly important influence
on the effectiveness of strategies involving SARS testing.
Our reported test sensitivity for the multiplex PCR
assays, which detect common respiratory viruses and bac-
teria, is lower than values reported in the medical literature
(20–22). Since estimates in the literature reflect experi-
mental conditions and are essentially measures of test effi-
cacy, we wished to estimate real-world effectiveness of
these tests by taking into account factors such as ineffec-
tive specimen collection methods, delays in laboratory
testing, or other related factors. 
Our analysis demonstrates that influenza vaccination
would lead to cost-savings, which has been reported in
other studies of healthy adults in the pre-SARS era (31,37).
However, the specific benefits quantified in our analysis
would only be realized if the conditions of the model were
to occur, i.e., the reemergence of SARS during a respirato-
ry season, when epidemiologic links between cases are
poorly defined.
Finally, our analysis does not adequately address the
complexities of microbiologic coinfection in the develop-
ment of FRIs. While our model allows for multiple posi-
tive test results, we assume that only 1 organism is
responsible for causing an FRI. This issue is particularly
relevant when considering SARS coinfection with other
respiratory organisms (39). Nonetheless, in our analysis
the effect of SARS coinfection on a population level is
minimal given that SARS-CoV infections make up only
0.01% of all FRIs.
Speculation about the reemergence of SARS has
prompted heightened surveillance by health officials
worldwide. Given that SARS has resurfaced in each of the
past 2 respiratory seasons in the absence of accidental lab-
oratory exposures, SARS-CoV may reappear annually at
times when FRIs are widely prevalent among the general
population. Even if the world does not experience another
large-scale, multinational outbreak, healthcare providers
around the globe will continue to see patients with nonspe-
cific FRIs who are incidentally returning from SARS-
affected areas. This fact underscores the importance of
having evidence-based guidelines to facilitate the timely
and accurate distinction of SARS infections from other
Distinguishing Febrile Respiratory Illnesses from SARS
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vides guidance on the most effective and efficient use of
resources when managing persons with FRIs of undeter-
mined etiology when the epidemiologic history for SARS
is either unavailable or unreliable. Our findings will help
policy makers and healthcare practitioners make decisions
based on available evidence and avoid decisions that are
driven by fear and misinformation. 
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